




Faced with greenwashing, consumers cannot ascertain the environ-
mental friendliness of products and green goods may be driven out of
the market. An informed government can overcome the lemons prob-
lem by using taxes to reveal information about the environmental
performance of ￿rms. This requires the tax choice to prevent con-
sumers from mistaking brown ￿rms for green ￿rms. The Pigovian tax
signals brown ￿rms, and green ￿rms are introduced either by zero tax,
or a speci￿c tax. When positive, the ￿introductory tax￿internalizes
the negative externality consumers exert on green ￿rms by ignoring
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1them. When taxes fail to separate brown and green ￿rms, pooling
equilibrium taxes mitigate the lemons problem.
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naling.
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2Introducing Green Goods
1 Introduction
Antoine-Augustin Parmentier remained famous for the astute means by which
he managed to convince Frenchmen of the nutritional bene￿ts of the potato.
To draw attention on the unknown root, he set an armed guard over a potato
patch which had been allotted him by order of Louis XVI. So much fuss con-
vinced the people that the potato must be a valuable new produce. The
guard was withdrawn at night to let the people steal potatoes with impunity
and grow them in their own garden plots. So were introduced potatoes into
France in 1787.
This publicity stunt illustrates that public policy has a role to play in pro-
moting unknown goods. In particular when consumers have trouble deter-
mining the social bene￿t of new goods such as ￿green￿goods which cause less
harm to the environment than their existing substitutes. Parmentier￿ s trick
shows that an informed government can turn cheap talk about the virtues of
a new good into a credible signal by imposing costs on consumers. Although
￿ctitious, these costs were perceived by the people to be high in Parmentier￿ s
case, since they were the price of committing an o⁄ence against law. Lower
(and more natural) is the utility loss entailed by taxes on consumption goods.
This suggests that they could as well be used by the government as a means
3of communication.
This article examines how much information about the environmental
performance of ￿rms taxes convey from an informed government to imper-
fectly informed consumers. The analysis shows that taxes may potentially be
used to introduce green goods. A signaling model is developed, which begins
with the presumption that a market is a⁄ected by the following Akerlof￿ s
(1970) lemons problem: consumer ignorance about the environmental per-
formance of ￿rms drives a green good out of the market. Although consumers
are willing to pay more for the green good than for its brown counterpart
which pollutes the environment, they do not buy the green good because
they lack reliable information about the true environmental performance of
￿rms and mistrust green claims. Excessive greenwashing1 may explain why
consumers place little con￿dence in unsubstantiated claims about the envi-
ronmental performance of ￿rms. In such a context, uninformed consumers
may try to infer the true environmental performance of ￿rms from taxes.
They become signals which should not be misleading in the hands of the
government. The analysis identi￿es conditions under which the tax choice
overcomes the lemons problem by revealing that ￿rms are green, either di-
1Greenwashing encompasses all practices that range from vague claims to misleading
advertising about the environmental performance of ￿rms. Some evidence that greenwash-
ing is becoming widespread in the U. S. can be found in the growing number of complaints
about green ads received by the Advertising Standard Authority. See Lyon and Maxwell
(2006) for more on greenwashing, and Mahenc (2007) for reasons why consumers might
be misinformed about the environmental performance of products.
4rectly or indirectly.
The standard Pigovian tax is shown to play this role indirectly because it
signals to consumers which goods are the brown ones. Moreover, a novel kind
of taxes emerges for the purpose of directly signaling green ￿rms, thereby
introducing green goods. These taxes will be called ￿introductory taxes￿
throughout the article. Clearly, introductory taxes are temporary. Their one
and only rationale is to induce consumers to try green goods in much the
same way that Parmentier advertised potatoes. By revealing that goods are
green, introductory taxes persuade consumers that goods are worth buying.
As a result, green ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table to enter the informed market and the
lemons problem is worked out. This extends the role of environmental taxes
beyond that, traditionally emphasized by the environmental literature, of
both an e¢ cient instrument for internalizing the marginal social damage from
pollution and an e⁄ective device for raising public revenue (see, for instance,
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994) or Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994)). To
some extent, the introductory tax follows the same logic as the Pigovian tax
in that it internalizes a negative externality. Asymmetric information poses
real costs to society by discarding green ￿rms. Consumers face little or no
incentive to take them into account in their purchase decisions. By placing
an explicit value on the external consequences of asymmetric information,
the introductory tax forces consumers to recognize them.
The reason why the signal sent by an introductory tax is credible does
5not stem from the usual single-crossing property of signaling game. On the
contrary, the government is less inclined to tax goods when they are green
than when they are brown. Nevertheless, the introductory tax is a successful
means by which to convey information because there is no opportunity cost
for the government to levy a tax on green goods which otherwise would be
ignored. The introductory tax turns out to be positive when the environ-
mental damage is low relatively to the surplus that consumers derive from
the green variety and, moreover, the government faces correct incentives to
prevent consumers from mistaking brown ￿rms for green ￿rms. When taxes
fail to separate brown and green ￿rms, pooling equilibrium taxes may exist.
They mitigate the lemons problem in that green ￿rms must enter the market
to allow for the possibility of consumer mistake.
The present analysis of tax signaling draws on the models proposed by
Milgrom and Roberts (1982 and 1986) to investigate the use of price and
advertising as signaling devices for experience goods. As noted by Kotchen
(2006), goods and services claiming that they are green are being introduced
rapidly in many sectors of the economy in response to the growing environ-
mental concern of people. Green goods are often experience goods in that
it is di¢ cult to observe how green they truly are. Also, even if environ-
mental friendliness somehow is observable, it may not be easily veri￿able.
The government, as an environmental regulator, is usually endowed with the
technical information that the public does not possess. For instance, the gov-
6ernment will be more able than the public to assess the true social costs of
using renewable energy sources or redesigning production methods to reduce
emissions. Boyer and La⁄ont (1999) defend the assumption that the govern-
ment generally has superior knowledge of the environmental characteristics
of products on the ground that the government obtains superior data from
con￿dential reports of the public service bureaucracy. A similar assumption
that the government has an informational advantage over economic agents
can also be found in the literature on ￿scal actions as signals (see Rogo⁄
(1990), for instance, for a model in which citizens infer the government￿ s
administrative competence from tax and expenditure policies distortions).
The signaling approach here also links up with the works of Barigozzi and
Villeneuve (2004) and Brett and Keen (2000). Assuming that agents are less
informed than the government on the e⁄ect of their consumption, Barigozzi
and Villeneuve (2004) show that the government must distort the Ramsey-
Sandmo tax downward to fully reveal to agents the detrimental e⁄ects of
their consumption. Brett and Keen (2000) investigate the role of earmarking
as a way of signaling both the type of incumbent policymaker and the level
of environmental damage. In their model, environmental taxes remain un-
informative in equilibrium. This result casually dismisses that much of the
information transmission is likely to occur through taxation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formalizes a lemons problem
in an environmental context. To address this problem, Section 3 proposes
7a signaling model of environmental taxation and analyses the separating
equilibria. Section 4 argues, on the basis Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984), that
ecolabeling by itself cannot solve the lemons problem. Section 5 concludes.
2 A lemons problem
The starting point is a market failure due to the following lemons problem:
if consumers cannot tell a green (environmental friendly) good from a brown
(environmental unfriendly) good, the latter may drive the former out of a
competitive market.
More formally, consider a good for which there are potentially two vari-
eties i, the brown (i = b) and the green (i = g). The green variety is produced
by competitive ￿rms using a ￿clean￿technology that does not harm the en-
vironment, while the brown variety is produced by competitive ￿rms that
generate polluting emissions or wastes. Let "i be an index of the environ-
mental damage, with "b > 0 when ￿rms are brown and "g = 0 when they are
green.
The green variety is more valued than the brown variety by all consumers.
Their willingness-to-pay is represented by ￿b and ￿g for the brown and the
green variety respectively, with ￿b < ￿g. All consumers are identical with
utility function given by u(x;￿i) ￿ px if they pay p and consume x units of
variety i, and 0 if they do not buy. To simplify computations, it will be
8assumed that u(x;￿i) = ￿ix￿x2=2, which yields the linear demand function
Di (p) = ￿i ￿ p for variety i. The net consumer surplus has the simple
following form:
Si (p) = max





Consumers initially lack information about the environmental perfor-
mance of ￿rms, hence the actual level of environmental damage. Consumers￿
prior information is represented as follows: they believe ￿rms to be green
with a commonly known probability ￿ 2 [0;1], and brown with probability
1 ￿ ￿. Let ￿ ￿ ￿￿g + (1 ￿ ￿)￿b be the expected valuation that consumers
have for the good.
Firms produce the good with a constant-returns-to-scale technology. Firm
i￿ s technology (production plus pollution abatement) will be represented by
the following cost function c(x;"i) = cix. Unlike brown ￿rms, green ￿rms use
advanced abatement technologies and clean up wastes. One usually expects
such e⁄orts to reduce the environmental damage at the expense of signi￿cant
private costs. The statement that there is a trade-o⁄ between environmen-
tal improvements and ￿rms e¢ ciency is consistent with the conclusions of
Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995) or Jorgenson and Wilcoxen (1990) for the
U. S. economy. Hence, a natural assumption is cb < cg, that is, the mar-
ginal production costs of green ￿rms are higher than those of brown ￿rms.
9As ￿rms are assumed to be price takers, they enter the market until pro￿ts
are zero. Firms make choices of environmental performance at the time of
entering the market.
To allow for the possibility of a lemons problem similar to that described
by Akerlof (1970), I will focus on parameter values such that:
Assumptions 1. cb < ￿b and cg < ￿g:
Assumption 2. ￿b < cg:
By Assumptions 1, producing either variety is socially e¢ cient. Assump-
tion 2 may raise adverse selection in the sense that green ￿rms are driven
out of the market when consumers are insu¢ ciently persuaded that they are
green (consumers expect zero utility from buying a variety thought of to
be brown with probability 1, at the competitive price of the green variety).
More precisely, when prior beliefs ￿ are so low that ￿ < cg, adverse selec-
tion causes a lemons problem in which the green variety does not sell even
though potential buyers value the green variety more than what it would cost
to produce it.
3 Solving the lemons problem with taxes
The government can levy a green tax t on polluting consumption. Let T ￿
[0;+1) be the set of possible taxes. It will be assumed, as in Diamond
(1973), that any tax revenue is returned to consumers via lump-sum transfers
10T. The demand for the good can be rewritten as a function of p + t and ￿,
that is, respectively, the price p+t to consumers and the expected valuation
that consumers have for the good. Let D(p + t;￿) = ￿ ￿ p ￿ t denote this
demand.
Free entry of ￿rms drives pro￿ts to zero, so that pi = ci; for i = b;g.
Hence, for given beliefs and tax, consumers purchase more the brown variety
than the green variety when they are sold at their competitive price.
The government￿ s budget constraint is given by tD(p + t;￿) = T. The
government aims to maximize social welfare subject to the decentralized op-
timizing behavior of consumers. For an index "i of environmental damage,
social welfare can be written in the following reduced form function:
W
i(t;￿) ￿ u(D(ci + t;￿);￿) ￿ ciD(pi + t;￿) ￿ "iD(ci + t;￿) (2)
= (￿ ￿ ci ￿ t)(￿ ￿ ci + t ￿ 2"i)=2 (3)
The expression given in (2) shows that social welfare has two compo-
nents: ￿rst, private welfare u(D(ci + t;￿);￿)￿ciD(ci + t;￿) which depends
on the consumers￿perception of ￿rms environmental performance, and sec-
ond, environmental welfare "iD(ci + t;￿) which also depends on the ac-
tual environmental damage. From the government￿ s viewpoint, ￿ = 0 is
the least favorable belief that consumers can hold since, for all ￿ > 0,
11W i(t;￿) > (￿b ￿ ci ￿ t)(￿b ￿ ci + t ￿ 2"i)=2 .
Interestingly enough, di⁄erentiating the social welfare function with re-
spect to tax shows the following.
Property 1. W
g
t (t;￿) = ￿t < W b
t (t;￿) = ￿t + "b:
Thus, the government is more inclined to levy a tax on the good when
￿rms are brown because the resulting decrease in consumption reduces the
environmental damage. Clearly, this motivates the government to impose
a Pigovian tax when ￿rms are brown and zero tax when ￿rms are green.
Nevertheless, under asymmetric information, the government may have a
greater incentive for using tax as a signaling device when ￿rms are green,
because she departs from a zero-tax situation, while the government already
has to tax the good when ￿rms are brown.
Let us now de￿ne ti(￿) as the maximizer of W i(t;￿) with respect to t, for
i = b;g. Using (3), straightforward calculations show that ti(￿) = "i for an
interior solution. Not surprisingly, this tax is set at the Pigovian level when
consumers￿perceptions are accurate, that is, tg(￿g) = 0 with green ￿rms, and
tb(￿b) = minf￿b ￿ cb;"bg with brown ￿rms.
To guarantee an interior solution in the latter case, I will maintain,
throughout the paper, the following assumption:
Assumption 3. "b < ￿b ￿ cb.
With this assumption, setting tb(￿b) = "b does not drive brown ￿rms out
of the market. Under complete information, tb(￿b) is then optimally chosen to
12fully internalize the marginal environmental damage caused by brown ￿rms,
and there is no reason to tax green ￿rms. Under asymmetric information,
uninformed consumers can use taxes as statistics to get information about
the environmental performance of ￿rms. Then, taxes become signals, either
separating if they fully reveal information, or pooling if they conceal infor-
mation. The main di¢ culty for the government is to prevent the tax from
misleading consumers. This imposes additional incentive-compatibility con-
straints on the government￿ s behavior, which follows from using the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium concept as de￿ned below.
As the government￿ s choice of tax can be observed by consumers before
they make their consumption decision, the model has a structure of signaling
game, for which strategies must form a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. First,
Nature draws a type i of environmental performance for ￿rms, according
to the probability distribution ￿. Second, the government and ￿rms learn
which type of environmental performance ￿rms have, and the government
sets a tax. After observing this tax, consumers in the third stage rely on
their inferences upon the true value of i to make their consumption decision.
Let ￿(t) : (0;1) ￿ T ! [0;1] denote consumers￿posterior belief that ￿rms
are green, which updates the prior ￿ when the tax is t. I assume that, after
observing tax choice t, all consumers hold the same beliefs about the ￿rms
type regardless of whether the observed price is on or o⁄ the equilibrium
path. I de￿ne by ￿(￿(t)) ￿ ￿(t)￿g +(1￿￿(t))￿b the expected valuation that
13consumers have for the good after observing t. The government must take
into account how her choice of tax in￿ uences the consumers￿inferences.
Note that the signaling game de￿ned above is not standard in that pri-
vate information concerns a three-dimensional parameter, namely (￿i;ci;"i).
For this reason, I cannot employ the usual techniques as they stand2. In
particular, the very useful single-crossing condition has no straightforward
equivalent here since W i
t(t;￿)=W i
￿(t;￿) = ("i ￿ t)=(￿ ￿ ci ￿ "i), that is, the
marginal rate of substitution between tax and perceived environmental per-
formance is strictly increasing with both parameters ci and "i which, by
assumption, are negatively correlated. Hence, when the privately known pa-
rameter increases in one dimension, it decreases in the other one. Therefore
I will perform a case-by-case analysis.
Restricting attention to pure strategies, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium
of this game is a set of strategies f(t￿
i)i=b;g;(D￿ (ci + t;￿(￿￿(t))))i=b;gg and a
probability distribution ￿￿ (t) such that, at any stage of the game, strategies
must be optimal given beliefs:
Condition 1: The government￿ s choice of tax maximizes social welfare
given that consumers respond optimally.







2See, for example, Cho and Kreps (1987), Cho and Sobel (1990) and Mailath (1987).
14Condition 2: Consumers￿ consumption of the good maximizes their
utility given their beliefs induced by the government￿ s behavior.
For all ti and ci,
D
￿ (ci + ti;￿(￿
￿(t))) 2 argmax
x u(x;￿(￿
￿(t))) ￿ (ci + ti)x + T:
Condition 3: The equilibrium concept places no restriction on beliefs
o⁄ the equilibrium path. Consumers form posterior beliefs from their prior























To tackle somewhat the problem of equilibria multiplicity, I will impose
the additional restrictions on o⁄-the-equilibrium-path beliefs, which adapt
the logic of the ￿intuitive criterion￿(see Cho and Kreps (1987)) to my par-
ticular signaling game. Formally, consider an equilibrium in which the level
of social welfare is W i when ￿rms type is i. Then the equilibrium fails to









15Let us now characterize the set of separating equilibrium taxes. I can
without loss of generality let consumers￿beliefs be the least favorable ones






. Such beliefs will
generate all of the possible perfect Bayesian equilibrium paths. Indeed, if a
government of any type does not have an incentive to set t when ￿(t) 6= 0;
then she will not have an incentive when ￿(t) = 0, since social welfare is
lower. The ￿rst result is that, when ￿rms are brown, the best choice for the
government is to set the tax at the Pigovian level.
Lemma 1: The government must set the separating equilibrium tax t￿
b =
"b.
Proof : (see Appendix 1)
Consider now situations where consumers mistake one type of ￿rms for
the other type.
On one hand, if consumers assign probability 1 to green ￿rms while
they are in fact brown, demand for the good after observing some tax t
is D(cb + t;￿g) and social welfare is given by
W
b(t;￿g) = maxf0;(￿g ￿ cb ￿ t)(￿g ￿ cb ￿ t ￿ 2"b)=2g: (6)
Note that, by Assumption 3, "b < ￿b ￿ cb < ￿g ￿ cb, so that the Pigovian
tax tb(￿b) = "b cannot drive brown ￿rms out of the market when they are
thought of as green with probability 1.
16On the other hand, if consumers are wrongly convinced that green ￿rms
are brown, no consumer accepts to buy the good by Assumption 2. Hence,
green ￿rms are driven out of the market and social welfare is nil. So, when
￿b < cg, there is strictly no opportunity cost for the government to signal
that ￿rms are green.
To reveal that ￿rms are green, the government must choose a tax t￿
g that










g;￿g) ￿ 0: (8)
Consider ￿rst condition (8). It guarantees that the government would
rather choose t￿
g and promote green ￿rms than let the market vanish. Using
(3), this condition yields
￿








=2 ￿ 0: (9)
Let tg ￿ ￿g ￿ cg denote the highest tax level for which condition (9)
holds. The tax tg extracts all the surplus that consumers can get when they
perfectly identify green ￿rms and buy the green variety at the competitive
price. Any tax equal or lower than tg is worth signaling green ￿rms which
17would otherwise be driven out of the market.
Let us now turn to condition (7). It ensures that consumers would not
mistake the Pigovian tax t￿
g for the introductory tax intended for promoting
green ￿rms. Note that W b("b;￿b) = Sb (cb + "b), that is, the net consumer
surplus derived from the price cb+"b which re￿ ects the total (private + social)
cost of producing the brown variety. It also measures here the government￿ s
incentive to prevent consumers from mistaking brown ￿rms for green ones.
Inequality (7) can be rewritten as
￿








=2 ￿ (￿b ￿ cb ￿ "b)
2 =2: (10)
The equality version of (10) admits an upper and lower root for t￿
g, which
will be denoted by tb and tb respectively. Note that tb < 0 for parameter






Both of the following propositions establish necessary conditions for a
separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion.
Proposition 1: If W b(tg;￿g) ￿ Sb (cb + "b) < W b(0;￿g), then t￿
b = "b
and t￿
g = tb are the only separating equilibrium taxes satisfying the intuitive
criterion.
Proof : (see Appendix 2)
18Parameter con￿gurations such that Sb (cb + "b) < W b(0;￿g) yield that
tb < 0. This precludes signaling green ￿rms with a tax strictly lower than
tb, in accordance with the incentive-compatibility constraint (10). Thus,
setting zero tax in this case would not convey any information to consumers
in equilibrium. They expect a high tax, too high to be mistaken for the
Pigovian tax, to mean green ￿rms. Inequality W b(tg;￿g) ￿ Sb (cb + "b) says
that the tax tg ful￿lls (7). Recall that tg is the tax that extracts all the
consumer surplus when consumers perfectly identify green ￿rms. Thus, tg is
the most costly signal that the government can send to reveal that ￿rms are
green. If, instead, the tax tg convinces consumers that ￿rms are green while
they are in fact brown, then the resulting welfare is W b(tg;￿g). It marks out
the worst situation from the government￿ s point of view, since the most costly
signal turns to mislead consumers. Parameter values satisfying W b(tg;￿g) ￿
Sb (cb + "b) guarantee that the worst signal available to introduce green ￿rms
cannot be mistaken for the Pigovian tax.
Under these parameter con￿gurations, it turns out that the Pigovian tax
signal brown ￿rms and the most e¢ cient way for the government to signal
green ￿rms is to set tb, that is, the lowest tax immune against a mistake
for the Pigovian tax. Clearly, this imposes costs on consumers by reducing
their consumption when ￿rms are green, while no tax would be justi￿ed if
everyone had perfect information. Nevertheless, the utility loss entailed by
tb is necessary to transmit information in a credible manner. Furthermore,
19the government must be careful not to mislead consumers. The tax tb is
calculated to give consumers who would mistake brown ￿rms for green ￿rms
exactly the same surplus as that obtained with the Pigovian tax. From (7),
this is the least costly way for the government to avoid misleading consumers.
By setting tb when ￿rms are green, the government minimizes the welfare loss
from reducing consumption with a tax. The intuitive equilibrium stated in
Proposition 1 corresponds to the ￿least-cost separating equilibrium￿which
has received much emphasis in the work of Spence (1974), Riley (1979) and
Cho-Kreps (1987), among others.
The tax tb is speci￿cally aimed at introducing green goods, therefore I call
it an ￿introductory tax￿ . It is temporary since the mere reason why it should
be used is to reveal that goods are green, thereby solving the initial lemons
problem. Once they are persuaded that the variety is green, consumers are
willing to pay more for the good. As a result, green ￿rms ￿nd it pro￿table
to enter the informed market.
There is some analogy between the logic of the introductory tax and
that followed by the Pigovian tax. The introductory tax forces consumers
to internalize the negative externality they exert on green ￿rms by ignoring
them (in much the same way that the Pigovian tax leads brown ￿rms to
internalize correctly the costs of pollution).
Nevertheless, setting zero tax when ￿rms are green may also achieve
separation in the following circumstances.
20Proposition 2: If W b(0;￿g) ￿ Sb (cb + "b), then t￿
b = "b and t￿
g = 0 are
the only separating equilibrium taxes satisfying the intuitive criterion.
Proof : (see Appendix 3)
Parameters in the constellation de￿ned by W b(0;￿g) ￿ Sb (cb + "b) allow
the government to signal green ￿rms with a tax lower than tb. Hence, the
government can now separate green ￿rms from the brown signaled by the
Pigovian tax, either with a higher tax or a lower tax. Obviously, the most
e¢ cient way for the government to signal green ￿rms is to choose zero tax.
At ￿rst appearance, there is no di⁄erence between this equilibrium outcome
and that of perfect information. Nevertheless, the Pigovian tax that achieves
separation has an informational role which has never been acknowledged in
the previous literature. It indirectly promotes the green variety by signaling
the brown one. After observing zero tax, consumers rationally infer that
￿rms are green because they know that, were ￿rms brown, they would have
to pay the Pigovian tax.
The following proposition establishes su¢ cient conditions for the nonex-
istence of a separating equilibrium.





separating equilibrium can exist.
Condition Sb (cb + "b) < W b(0;￿g) implies that tb < 0, thus separa-
tion cannot be achieved with a tax t￿
g lower than tb. Furthermore, the
21incentive-compatibility constraint (8) requires t￿
g to be lower tg and condition
Sb (cb + "b) < W b(tg;￿g) implies that tg < tb. Proposition 3 states parameter
con￿gurations for which no separating equilibrium exists. Obviously, this
nonexistence result does not dismiss pooling equilibria. Let t￿ = t￿
g = t￿
b
denote the uninformative tax that gives a pooling equilibrium. Since it is the
same tax levied by the government whatever the environmental performance
of ￿rms, consumers￿posterior beliefs after observing the tax t￿ are the same
as their prior beliefs, that is, ￿￿(t￿
g) = ￿￿(t￿
b) = ￿. To be part of a pooling








￿;￿(￿)) ￿ 0: (12)
Note that requiring (12) mitigates the lemons problem since it allows
for the possibility that green ￿rms enter the market. Clearly, consumers
could not mistake brown ￿rms for green ￿rms if they were staying outside
of market. It can easily be found a whole range of su¢ ciently high values
for ￿ such that, say, t￿ = "b ful￿lls both conditions (11) and (12). Consider,
for instance, that ￿ = 1. Then, (11) and (12) yield (￿b ￿ cb ￿ "b)
2 =2 ￿
(￿g ￿ cb ￿ "b)
2 =2 and ((￿g ￿ cg)2 ￿ "2
b)=2 ￿ 0, respectively. Both inequalities
hold by Assumptions 2 and 3, hence conditions (11) and (12) also hold for
22￿ close to 1 by continuity. A more tedious task would be to identify the
multiple pooling equilibria that satisfy the intuitive criterion. Nevertheless,
the aim of this article is to examine whether taxes can be used to transmit
full information to consumers and the analysis of intuitive pooling equilibria
is postponed for further research.
So far I have characterized necessary conditions for a separating equilib-
rium robust to the intuitive criterion. I can now summarize the results in
the following existence proposition.
Proposition 4: A separating equilibrium satisfying the intuitive criterion
exists if and only if
(￿g ￿ cg)=2 < "b and W
b(0;￿g) ￿ Sb (cb + "b); (13)
or if
"b < (￿g ￿ cg)=2 and W
b(tg;￿g) < Sb (cb + "b): (14)
Proof : (see Appendix 4 for calculations)
The parameter con￿gurations ful￿lling both conditions (13) roughly say
that misleading consumers with zero tax is the worst situation from the so-
cial point of view. Appendix 4 shows that (￿g ￿ cg)=2 < "b is equivalent to
23W b(tg;￿g) > W b(0;￿g). In other words, when the environmental damage is
high relatively to consumer surplus from the green variety, misleading con-
sumers with zero tax is socially more costly than misleading them with the
worst possible signal tg. Condition W b(0;￿g) ￿ Sb (cb + "b) means that it is
better from the social point of view to signal brown ￿rms with the Pigovian
tax than to mislead consumers with zero tax, mainly because consumers de-
rive a large surplus from the brown variety. Under the circumstances de￿ned
by (13), the government is better o⁄ signaling brown ￿rms with the Pigov-
ian tax or choosing zero tax to reveal that ￿rms are green. Consumers view
these signals as credible even though they are costless. If the environmental
damage is high, so is the Pigovian tax which is meant for internalizing the
pollution externality. This explains why separating green ￿rms with zero tax
cannot mislead consumers. Moreover, if the brown variety gives consumers a
large surplus, then the government￿ s incentive to avoid consumers￿mistake
is strong, which makes signaling green ￿rms so easy for the government that
it is costless.
The parameter con￿gurations given by (14) indicate that misleading con-
sumers with the worst possible signal tg is socially the most costly outcome.
Inequality "b < (￿g ￿ cg)=2 says that it is even worse to mislead consumers
with tg than with zero tax. As the environmental damage is relatively low,
the Pigovian tax re￿ ecting it must also be low. Moreover, consumers receive
a somewhat high surplus from consuming the green variety. Thus, consumers
24have the willingness and ability to accept the payment of a positive tax to
get informed about the green ￿rms. In this parameter constellation, the
government may separate green ￿rms either with zero tax or with an intro-
ductory tax. From W b(tg;￿g) < Sb (cb + "b), signaling brown ￿rms with the
Pigovian tax is socially more desirable than misleading consumers with tg.
The fact that consumers receive a somewhat large surplus from the brown
variety is necessary to achieve separation. Under the parameter values sat-
isfying (14), the most e¢ cient way for the government to signal green ￿rms
is to set an introductory tax too high to be mistaken for the Pigovian tax
when the further condition Sb (cb + "b) < W b(0;￿g) is met. In such a case,
the government has no incentive to avoid misleading consumers with zero
tax when ￿rms are brown, but also a strong incentive to prevent consumers
from mistaking the worst possible signal tg with the Pigovian tax. If the





then, by Proposition 3, the tax fails to separate green ￿rms from their brown
counterparts and only pooling taxes can exist.
4 Failure of ecolabeling
It might be argued that the lemons problem introduced at the beginning
could easily be solved by speci￿c information programs. I end up by showing
that ecolabeling is worthless as a signal of environmental performance in the
25initial framework without tax.
Faced with adverse selection, the market is known to use a variety of
signals which, in the present context, might convince consumers that ￿rms
are green. Were competition imperfect, price and conspicuous expenditures
such as advertising would doubtless force themselves as e¢ cient ways for
green ￿rms to signal high environmental performance (see the huge literature
initiated by Nelson (1974) on this subject). With competitive ￿rms, however,
prices are no longer strategic variables, and so they are worthless as signals.
Furthermore, it is not so clear that advertising environmental performance,
say through ￿ecolabels￿ , could be successful in solving the lemons problem
here. An argument taken from Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) suggests that,
on the contrary, ecolabeling can hardly transmit all information about ￿rms
environmental performance. To ￿t the argument to the model above, I will
consider in what follows that ecolabeling raises the probability that ￿rms are
green provided that they are truly green.
Consider that green ￿rms have the opportunity to buy the right to attach
a speci￿c ecolabel to their product3. Ecolabeling is typically voluntary and
costly in terms of auditing and testing. Moreover, ecolabeling programs do
not always provide speci￿c information about the product4 and they are
3Ecolabeling systems range from government-sponsored schemes to private systems.
Current examples are the Green Seal in the united States, the Nordic Swan in Scandi-
navia, the European Union Eco-Label Award Scheme, the Blue Angel in Germany or the
Japanese Eco-Mark. In many areas, the testing and labeling of products are handled by
organizations which have sprung up speci￿cally to provide this service.
4For instance, this is the case of the Energy Star label displayed by energy-e¢ cient
26more or less reliable from one area to another (see for instance Cason and
Gangadharan (2002)). The latter feature suggests that ecolabeling plays a
￿persuasive￿role rather than an informative role, according to the distinction
made by Bagwell (2005). That is, conspicuous ecolabel expenditures raise the
valuation that consumers have for the good. The payment e for the ecolabel
is observable. In this respect, ecolabeling is a potential signal that ￿rms
are environmental friendly. Let ￿(e) be the prior probability that ￿rms are
green upon seeing e, where ￿(e) is a strictly increasing function that satis￿es
￿(0)￿g + (1 ￿ ￿(0))￿b = cg. Hence, the higher the payment for the ecolabel,
the more reliable the green claim it displays. Moreover, in the absence of
ecolabel, no consumer is initially willing to pay more than the marginal cost
for the green variety. Thus, ￿rms must spend some amount on ecolabeling
in order to persuade consumers to purchase the green variety.
These premises build a signaling model similar to that developed by
Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984). Nature determines whether ￿rms are brown
or green. Then, conditional on their environmental performance, ￿rms choose
how much to spend on ecolabeling and freely enter the market, so that in
equilibrium pro￿ts will always be zero. After observing prices and an even-
tual payment for an ecolabel, consumers make their purchase decisions.
An ecolabeling separating equilibrium is a pair of prices (pb;pg), and an
ecolabeling level e such that the following conditions hold:
products in the U. S. (see Stavins (2000))
271. Equilibrium is achieved in the market for each variety when pro￿ts are
nil:
pb = cb: (15)
(pg ￿ cg)Dg(pg) ￿ e = 0: (16)
2. Incentive compatibility constraints guarantee that, respectively, brown
￿rms do not ￿nd it pro￿table to buy the ecolabel, and green ￿rms do
not fail to pay for the ecolabel. That is:
(pg ￿ cb)Dg(pg) ￿ e ￿ 0: (17)
pb ￿ cg ￿ 0: (18)
3. All consumers hold the same beliefs about environmental performance
regardless of whether the observed price is on or o⁄ the equilibrium
path. Beliefs on the equilibrium path are derived using Bayes￿rule.
This implies here that upon seeing pg and e (resp. pb), consumers must
assign probability one to the ￿rms being green (resp. brown).
The following lemma states that the assumption that the green variety
is more costly to produce is a su¢ cient condition for the nonexistence of
informative ecolabeling.
28Lemma 2: If cb < cg , then no ecolabeling separating equilibrium can
exist.
The proof is straightforward. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium
in which e > 0. Then, conditions (15);(16) and (18) imply that pb = cb ￿
cg < pg, while conditions (16) and (17) imply that cg ￿ cb. Thus, a necessary
condition for an ecolabeling separating equilibrium to exist is that cb = cg.
In order for ecolabeling to be an e⁄ective signal, green ￿rms should be able
to recover ecolabeling expenditures while brown ￿rms cannot. This is not
possible here because the signaling costs entailed by positive ecolabeling are
the same for both brown and green ￿rms. The inability to convey information
through ecolabeling leaves the lemons problem unsolved and only the brown
variety will be sold when prior beliefs ￿ are such that ￿ < cg.
So, the competitive market by itself demonstrably may fail to signal high
environmental performance, especially when marginal costs of brown and
green ￿rms are di⁄erent. This failure challenges the government to ￿nd
ways of harnessing the power of market forces on behalf of conveying full
information to consumers.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines a novel motive for environmental taxes in a context
where greenwashing drives environmental friendly ￿rms out of the market.
29Taxes can be used by an informed government to introduce green goods
which, otherwise, would be ignored by uninformed consumers. Because they
view taxes as statistics to get information about the environmental perfor-
mance of ￿rms, taxes potentially have a signaling role to play. Then, the
major task for the government is to prevent her tax policy from misleading
consumers. This imposes incentive-compatibility constraints on the govern-
ment￿ s behavior.
To formalize this idea, I present a signaling game and investigate the
existence of separating equilibrium taxes satisfying an adapted version of the
intuitive criterion. In such equilibria, the Pigovian tax is shown to signal
brown ￿rms, whereas green ￿rms are introduced by a speci￿c tax which is
nil or positive depending on the government￿ s incentive to avoid misleading
consumers. Introductory taxes can be seen as internalizing the negative
externality due to asymmetric information. Clearly, the lemons problem is
socially costly. By making explicit the value of this cost, introductory taxes
induce consumers to recognize the external consequences of their purchase
decisions.
My analysis crucially hinges on the two following assumptions. First,
green goods are more costly to produce than brown goods. Second, con-
sumers are willing to pay more for green goods. Under these assumptions,
consumers can accept some direct loss in utility to get information and view
introductory taxes as credible signals.
30Finally, when they overcome the lemons problem due to greenwashing,
introductory taxes harness, rather than obstruct, market forces. However,
the argument of the paper is not that introductory taxes are a panacea since
the market remains uninformed when only pooling equilibrium taxes can ex-
ist. This suggests to explore other communication tools that the government
or the market by itself could use to signal the environmental performance of
￿rms to consumers. Whatever the means by which the signal is sent, it will
be e⁄ective only if consumers have the willingness to accept some direct loss
in utility to obtain information.
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6.1 Appendix 1: Proof of lemma 1
Suppose for a contradiction that there exists a separating equilibrium in
which t￿
b 6= "b. As the consumers￿expectations are correct at equilibrium,




b;￿b) = (￿b ￿ cb ￿ t
￿
b)(￿b ￿ cb + t
￿
b ￿ 2"b)=2;
which is strictly lower than W b("b;￿b) = (￿b ￿ cb ￿ "b)
2 =2. Then, the
government would have an incentive to deviate to "b whatever the consumers￿
inference ￿ from observing "b. Indeed, for any ￿ 2 (0;1], we have W b("b;￿b) <
W b("b;￿(￿)). If t￿
b 6= "b, then W b(t￿
b;￿b) < W b("b;￿b) and so W b(t￿
b;￿b) <
W b("b;￿(￿)).
6.2 Appendix 2: Proof of proposition 1
Lemma 2 implies that t￿
b = "b, so the corresponding equilibrium welfare is
W b("b;￿b) = Sb (cb + "b). By Sb (cb + "b) < W b(0;￿g), we have tb < 0, which
prevents the government from separating green ￿rms with a tax t￿
g lower than
tb. Following (7), suppose now that separation is achieved in equilibrium at
tg > tb, yielding a welfare of W g. Then, for su¢ ciently small ￿ > 0, so that
32tg￿￿ > tb, we have W g < W g(tg￿￿;￿g) since W g(t;￿g) is decreasing in t > 0.
Moreover, tg￿￿ satis￿es W b(tg￿￿;￿g) < W b(tb;￿g) = W b("b;￿b) by de￿nition
of tb. Hence, tg ￿ ￿ is a deviation that ful￿lls both (4)and (5). Thus, any
separating equilibrium in which tg > tb fails to survive the intuitive criterion.
6.3 Appendix 3: Proof of proposition 2
We know from lemma 2 that t￿
b = "b. Moreover, W b(0;￿g) ￿ Sb (cb + "b)
yields that tb ￿ 0. Then, from (7), the government must set a tax t￿
g out-




to signal green ￿rms. The same proof as that
developed in Appendix 2 applies here, which shows that any separating equi-
librium in which tg > tb violates the intuitive criterion. This leaves the
possibility that t￿
g = tb or t￿
g 2 [0;tb]. However, for any positive candidate
t, both inequalities W g (t;￿g) < W g(0;￿g) and W b(t;￿g) ￿ W b("b;￿b) imply
that t violates the intuitive criterion since, according to its logic, the govern-
ment is better o⁄deviating to zero tax in order to fully reveal that ￿rms are
green. Thus, t￿
g = 0 is the only way of signaling green ￿rms while satisfying
the intuitive criterion.
6.4 Appendix 4: Calculations for proposition 4
Straightforward calculations yield that W b(tg;￿g) = W b(0;￿g)+(￿g￿cg)(2"b ￿ (￿g ￿ cg)).
Thus, "b < (￿g ￿ cg)=2 implies that W b(tg;￿g) < W b(0;￿g).
33Condition W b(0;￿g) ￿ Sb (cb + "b) can be expressed as
(￿g ￿ cb)
2 ￿ (￿b ￿ cb)
2 ￿ "
2
b + 2"b (￿g ￿ ￿b): (19)
Condition W b(tg;￿g) < Sb (cb + "b) can be rewritten as
(￿g ￿ cb)
2 ￿ (￿b ￿ cb)
2 ￿ (￿g ￿ cg)
2 < "
2
b + 2"b (cg ￿ ￿b): (20)
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